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Treating Physicians as Expert
Witnesses in Compensation Systems:
The Public Health Connection
BY BRIAN C. MURCHISON*
INTRODUCTION
T hepractice of public health consists of an elaborate web ofpolicies,
strategies, and disciplines, including law.' Law is an instrument of
public health in a broad sense when it is "used to establish norms for
healthy behavior and to help create the social conditions in which people
can be healthy."2 Law serves public health most directly through legislation
* Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University School of Law. B.A., J.D.,
Yale University. I wish to thank Dean Allen Vestal and Professor Dayna Matthew
for many helpful discussions on a range of issues relating to this Article; the
Frances Lewis Law Center for supporting the project; and Jeffrey A. Dickey for his
invaluable research assistance.
'For a detailed argument that "El]aw is an essential part of public health prac-
tice," see Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Law and the Public's Health: A Study of
Infectious Disease Law in the United States, 99 COLUM. L.REv. 59,61 (1999). The
authors note that "public health" has been broadly defined to embrace
organized community efforts for the sanitation of the environment, the
control of community infections, the education of individuals in principles
of personal hygiene, the organization of medical and nursing service for the
early diagnosis and preventive treatment of disease, and the development
of the social machinery which will ensure to every individual in the
community a standard of living adequate for the maintenance of health.
Id. at 69 (quoting Charles-Edward A. Winslow, The Untilled Fields of Public
Health, 51 SCIENCE 23, 30 (1920)). Some commentators are concerned that public
health encompasses such a multiplicity of tasks and perspectives that it "becomes
... a little bit of everything, and therefore not enough of anything." Jonathan M.
Mann, Public Health and Human Rights, HUM. RTS., Fall 1998, at 2, 4. In the
quest for "analytic and definitional clarity" of public health, Dean Mann proposed
a human rights framework that could give rise to an ethics of public health,
facilitating clearer articulation of public health positions relating to "respect for
autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice." Id. at 5.2 Gostin et al., supra note 1, at 61.
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aimed at preventing injury and disease within a given population.3 Other
legal devices that address injury and disease within populations are
compensation systems, including the common-law torts process and
administrative systems, both federal and state, that adjudicate claims of
disability, occupational disease, and occupational injury. However, the
connection between compensatory systems and public health is less
straightforward than the connection between preventative legislative
programs and public health, and thus the former has received scant
scholarly attention. In exploring the uncertain connection between
compensation systems and public health, this Article makes two arguments:
(1) that such systems can be important sources of information and public
pressure on important health issues, and (2) that the current adjudicatory
focus of some systems on the relationship between treating physicians and
patients is a salutary development that, if not ignored by decision makers
and if allowed to be more than an "empty formalit[y],"' 4 nay enhance the
credibility of specific decisions and promote public health objectives.
In what sense, if any, can compensation systems be classified as part
of public health? In his magisterial work, Public Health Law: Power, Duty,
and Restraint, Professor Lawrence 0. Gostin places tort law under the
rubric of public health law insofar as the tort system engages in "preventing
risky behavior and providing incentives for safer product design."5
However, Gostin emphasizes exceptionally high-profile litigation (tobacco
lawsuits and actions against gun makers) as examples of "the value of tort
law as a tool of public health,"6 and he does not delve deeply into the
question of the deterrent value of less notorious uses of civil remedies for
damages.' Moreover, Gostin omits any sustained reference to non-tort
3 E.g., LAWRENCE 0. GosTiN, PUBLIC HEALTHLAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT
12 (2000) (noting that "[p]ublic health services are those shared by all members of
the community, organized and supported by, and for the benefit of, the people as
a whole"); see also id. at 269 (summarizing study of "regulation principally as the
actions taken by legislatures and administrative agencies to prevent injury or
disease and to promote the public's health").
4 LINDA G.MmLS, APENCHANT FORPREJUDICE: UNRAVELING BIAS IN JUDICIAL
DEcIsIoN MAKING (1999) (finding the social security disability programs to be a
system marred by judicial bias, neglect of rules, and other problems).
5 GOSTIN, supra note 3, at 270.
6Id.
7 On deterrence as one of the principal aims of tort law, see generally DAN B.
DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 11 (2000). As Professor Dobbs explains:
The idea of deterrence is not so much that an individual, having been held
liable for a tort, would thereafter conduct himselfbetter. It is rather the idea
that all persons, recognizing potential tort liability, would tend to avoid
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compensation systems.' Perhaps his caution makes sense. Ifwe try to place
compensation systems, including tort, within the overarching scheme of
public health law, we quickly encounter a well-known, bruising critique:
that, despite legislative and common-law objectives, the unhappily frequent
real-world effect of such systems is not to deter harmful practices or
disease-causing conditions in the workplace, but rather simply to distribute
damages or social insurance benefits to those deemed eligible.' Perhaps,
conduct that could lead to tort liability. They might sometimes engage in the
conduct in question, but only if they could get more out of it than the tort
liability would cost.
Id. § 11, at 19. Deterrence is central to prominent theories of tort. See, e.g., GuiDo
CALABRESI, THE CosTS oFACcIDENTs: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970).
Skeptics abound, however. Some maintain that the "simple deterrence model
overemphasizes both the amount of overly dangerous activity that would occur
without tort liability, and the amount of injury-reduction achieved." Stephen D.
Sugarman, DoingAway with TortLaw, 73 CAL. L. REv. 555,561 (1985) (emphasis
omitted). Others are doubtful that deterrence theory finds any support in
"prevailing theories of human behavior." Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of
Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 115, 117 (1993).
8 Gostin does state that public health activities include governmental regulation
of occupational health and safety, GOSTIN, supra note 3, at 11, 15, 87, but he does
not specifically address administrative compensation systems. One reviewer of
Gostin's Public Health Law noted, "Gostin says little about many modem public
health regulatory regimes--such as food and drug, occupational safety, and
environmental law-or topics such as family law, which blend public health and
other concerns." John Akula, Public Health and Personal Liberties: Striking a
Balance, HEALTH AFFAIRS, May/June 2001, at 288,289 (book review).
9 See Emily A. Spieler, Perpetuating Risk? Workers' Compensation and the
Persistence of Occupational Injuries, 31 Hous. L. REV. 119 (1994). Professor
Spieler explores the paradox that rising compensation costs have done little to
"stimulate employers to engage in efforts to prevent occupational injury and
disease," id. at 123, and argues that "the design of the program encourages
motivated employers to attempt to prevent workers' compensation costs by
reducing the filing of claims instead of the occurrence of injuries," id. at 127. See
also PETER S. BARTH & H. ALLAN HUNT, WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND WORK-
RELATED ILLNESSES AND DISEASES 260 (1980) (emphasizing that workers'
compensation programs create "no adequate incentive for improving health at the
workplace to prevent long latent diseases") (emphasis omitted); Sidney A. Shapiro,
The Necessity of OSHA, KAN. J. L. & PuB. PoL'Y, Spring 1999, at 22, 29-30
("[W]orkers' compensation does not create significant incentives for employers to
invest in safety and health improvements .... [T]he price ofworkers' compensation
insurance does not reflect, or only partially reflects, the claims experience ofmany
employers .... [E]mployers will not invest in safety or health improvements if there
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then, compensation systems have no real part to play in the work of public
health.
The reverse may be true as well-that the work of public health has
little or no relation to compensation systems. Support for this possibility
comes from the dispiriting history of at least one major health problem that
eventually led to the creation of a compensation system with virtually no
help from public health authorities. In Black Lung: Anatomy of a Public
Health Disaster,"0 Allen Derickson recounts how state and federal govern-
ments ignored the problem of coal miners' respiratory diseases in the
nineteenth century," and how the U.S. Public Health Service ("PHS") in
the first half of the twentieth century engaged in an "indecisive, fractured
approach to producing and disseminating information" about mine-related
lung disease, leaving the coal industry with "nothing to fear from federal
officials [even in] the heyday of Progressivism."' 2 Finally in 1963, twenty
years after British research had led to the inclusion of coal workers'
pneumoconiosis as a compensable disease under British law, the PHS
undertook a prevalence study of respiratory problems among American
miners but declined to publish the results of its findings until three years
after field work ended.13 Even then, the PHS did little to probe the most
pressing issue affecting the health of American coal miners: whether non-
silicotic pneumoconiosis could affect the lungs of miners as seriously as
silicosis. 4 And it was only in 1969 after 40,000 protesting miners stopped
working across West Virginia that state legislators and the U.S. Congress
are lower cost methods to avoid compensation payments."). Professor Shapiro
points out that workers' compensation systems "fail[ ] to reimburse employees for
all of their accident and illness costs." Id. at 28. Professor Shapiro further notes
that this result is "not surprising because workers' compensation was never
designed to serve the economic function of compensating workers for the costs of
injuries and illnesses. The underlying policy of workers' compensation has always
been to keep an employee from starving, not to compensate the workers for his or
damages." Id. at 28-29. A publication of the American Public Health Association
has stated flatly that "[w]orkers' compensation has not yet been shown to deter
disease or injury or otherwise stimulate effective primary prevention of occupa-
tional injury or illness." PREVENTING OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE AND INJURY 78
(James L. Weeks et al., eds., 1991).
10 ALLENDERICKSON, BLACKLUNG: ANATOMY OFAPUBLICHEALTHDISASTER
(1998).
" Id. at 15.21d. at 70.
11Id. at 134.
14 See id. at 134-37.
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took action by creating compensation systems for black lung disease. '5
From the vantage point of the history of black lung in America, it is no
wonder that compensation systems and public health agencies are so rarely
linked in the public consciousness.
However, despite vulnerability to the charge of ineffective deterrence,
and despite the fact that some systems came into existence in spite of,
rather than because of, public health authorities, compensation systems
should be seen as potentially important elements of public health law for
several reasons. If Professor Gostin is right that the scope of "public health
law" includes programs "designed to identify, prevent, and ameliorate
health threats within society," 6 compensation systems surely qualify under
at least the first and the third criteria. There is little doubt that compensa-
tion systems can be crucial sources of information for the public as well as
lawmakers, regulators, and other policymakers engaged in public health
efforts to identify dangerous conditions, "to monitor community health
status[,] ... and [to] research for new insights and innovations."'17 For
example, in the adjudication of claims involving complex issues of disease
and causation, compensation systems turn a useful spotlight on how
government regulation and inspection programs are succeeding in their
efforts to prevent occupational disease and injury."8 In addition, these
systems can provide testing grounds for evolving understandings of
occupational disease and injury, thereby providing another source of
information for regulatory reform. 9 The case-by-case adjudication pro-
" See id. at 160-61.
16 GOSTIN, supra note 3, at 18.
'7Id. at 17.
18 See BARTH & HUNT, supra note 9, at 262-65 (suggesting ways in which
workers' compensation programs can add to worker and employer information and
thus reduce disease). For an account of how asbestos litigation was "beneficial in
uncovering hazards and company misconduct in the early cases," see also Elaine
Draper, Preventive Law by Corporate Professional Team Players: Liability and
Responsibility in the Work of Company Doctors, 15 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 525, 554 (1999) (citing PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE
ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL (1985)).
'9 For example, in the 1990s, federal black lung litigation addressed whether
dust-induced lung disease can include obstructive lung disorders. See, e.g., Warth
v. S. Ohio Coal Co., 60 F.3d 173, 175 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that "[c]hronic
obstructive lung disease... is encompassed within the definition ofpneumoconio-
sis for purposes of entitlement to Black Lung Benefits"). Eventually the Depart-
ment of Labor amended the black lung regulations to include chronic obstructive
lung disorders in the regulatory definition of compensable pneumoconiosis. See
Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine and Safety Act of 1969, as
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vided by these systems can also place human faces on occupational harms;
the personal histories disclosed by adjudication can provide lawmakers and
regulators a deeper grasp of the practical realities of diseases and injuries
in a variety of occupational contexts."
Of course, tort law and administrative benefits systems also serve to
"ameliorate" existing conditions by compensating distressed individuals
who are suffering present injury or illness and meet established criteria for
compensation. These individuals can be part of a large and undifferentiated
population, such as tort plaintiffs,21 or a legislatively specified population,
such as claimants for social security disability benefits, black lung
claimants, or other workers with job-related injury or illness.' In some
instances, these systems are products of sheer political necessity, and the
modicum of repair they make possible is part of a larger public health
initiative. For example, the black lung movement turned to federal
legislators in 1969 with two objectives: (1) federal control of dust levels in
coal mines as a means of preventing disease,23 - and (2) creation of a
compensation system for those already afflicted.24 Thus, although public
health regulation is primarily forward-looking, legal remedies for past
neglect and present harm also should be prominent and consistent concerns.
However, to make any strong contribution to the goals of communal
information-building and individual recovery, compensation systems must
have legitimacy. Intellectual integrity must govern the substance and
Amended, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,920, 79,923 (Dep't Labor Dec. 20, 2000) [hereinafter
Final Rule].20 For examples of works culling personal histories from compensation cases,
see MILLS, supra note 4; Ron Nixon, BlackLung a Stain on Miners'Lives; Health
Benefits Have Become Scarce for Virginia's Miners, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD
NEWS, Nov. 25, 2000, at Al (detailing how Virginia coal miners have been
frustrated by the black lung claims process); RonNixonA CoalfieldLegacy: Black
Lung; As Court Battles for Disability Benefits Drag On, Miners Slowly Suffocate,
ROANOKE TIMs & WORLD NEWS, Nov. 24, 2000, at Al [hereinafter Nixon, A
Coalfield Legacy] (same).
21 Gostin describes tort law as "[i]ndirect [r]egulation" implementing public
health objectives. GOsTIN, supra note 3, at 269.
22 Gostin acknowledges that, although "public health is theoretically intended
to safeguard the health and safety of whole populations, itoftenbenefits those most
at risk of injury and disease." Id. at 19 (noting instances of public health initiatives
that "hold particular significance" for groups who are "at immediate risk").
23 Derickson labels this a "straightforward public health approach" to disease
prevention. DERIcKsON, supra note 10, at 166.
24 Id. at 167-82 (detailing efforts to obtain both dust controls and a federal
compensation system).
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procedure of their work, so that their results credibly contribute to public
and individual good. Professor Stephen Carter variously defines "integrity"
as a faculty of discernment, a quality of deliberativeness, and "a guide to
being guided" in the assessment of reality.25 Applying the term to a host of
contexts, from marriage to legal ethics to civil disobedience, Professor
Carter emphasizes integrity's components of consistency, fidelity to
principle, and avoidance of arbitrary action.26 He thereby echoes John
Rawls' A Theory of Justice, which relates "integrity in the judicial
process"'27 to the truth sought by that process, arguing that "a legal system
must... contain rules of evidence that guarantee rational procedures of
inquiry."'28 According to Rawls, "[w]hile there are variations in these
procedures, the rule of law requires some form of due process: that is, a
process reasonably designed to ascertain the truth, in ways consistent with
the other ends of the legal system."'29 Professor Scott Brewer refers to the
integrity of legal systems as "intellectual due process," defined as a rule-of-
law norm basing a system's legitimacy on its capacity to render non-
arbitrary decisions.3" In the field of administrative compensation systems,
Professor Jerry Mashaw delineates how these structures struggle with
competing ideals ofjustice to pursue intellectual due process from within.1
A quest for more intellectually defensible elements of decision making
has been prominent within a number of compensation systems, including
the tort system, over the past ten years, but the results have been uncertain,
and the quest is ongoing. This Article concerns the effort to refine the
intellectual integrity of compensation systems through evidentiary rules
about expert witnesses in cases of occupational disease and other forms of
disability, where scientific knowledge is often incomplete and theories of
causation are contested.32
This Article's premise is that the core concern of the compensation
systems considered herein is distributive justice, a conception that "takes
25 STEPHEN L. CARTER, INTEGRITY 19 (1996).
26 See id. at 7.
27 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 238 (1971).
21Id. at 239.
29 Id.
30 Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and IntellectualDue Process, 107
YALE L.J. 1535, 1672-73 (1998) (citing RAWLS, supra note 27, at 238-39).31 Jerry Mashaw, Conflict and Compromise Among Models ofAdministrative
Justice, 1981 DuKEL.J. 181.
32 Professor Brewer defines an expert as one "who has or is regarded as having
specialized training that yields sufficient epistemic competence to understand the
aims, methods, and results of an expert discipline." Brewer, supra note 30, at 1589.
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justice in general to be concerned with apportioning fairly the burdens and
benefits of social life."'33 Thus, the tort system seeks the fair apportionment
of "the burdens and benefits of risky, yet valuable, activities,"34 and is
"only secondarily a matter of corrective justice" concerned with the
rectification of wrongful acts.35 Workers' compensation systems, too, are
based on the distributive principle "that the toll beneficial activities exact
in life, limb, and property damage should be fairly distributed,"'36 and the
social security disability program is part of the larger social security
system's goal of achieving a measure of "social adequacy" through income
redistribution.37 From this perspective, fact issues of causation and harm
33 Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of
Accidents, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 193, 195 (2000); see also Stephen R. Perry, Tort
Law, in ACOMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 71-72 (Dennis
Patterson ed., 1996). Professor Perry states that in tort theories "that take
distributive justice as their starting point, ... the point of distributive justice is
understood to be the just distribution of material resources, and perhaps other
goods, throughout society as awhole."Id at 71. On this view, tort law can be seen
as a device for "rectifying deviations from a pattern of holdings antecedently
determined to be just (axd also, perhaps, for moving an unjust pattern closer to a
just one)." Id.34 Keating, supra note 33, at 195.
351 Id. at 200.
36 Id. at 219. Professor Dobbs has noted that "[w]orkers' compensation plans
reflect the clearest expression of the enterprise liability ideas--that enterprise
should bear the costs it systematically produces, including the costs of injury."
DOBBS, supra note 7, § 392, at 1098. He adds that workers' compensation systems
at the same time "show a strong intent to limit significantly the employers'
liabilities." Id.37 For an account of the social security disability system as a need-based dis-
tributive system, see DEBORAH A. STONE, THE DISABLED STATE 15-28 (1984). For
a review and analysis of the goals of individual equity and social adequacy of the
social security system, see JEFFREY D. DUNN, REAPPRAISING SOCIAL SECURITY:
TowARD AN ALTERNATIVE SYSTEM 11-21 (1981). The Supreme Court long ago
characterized the social security system as "a form of social insurance, enacted
pursuant to Congress' power to spend money in aid of the general welfare."
Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 609 (1960) ( internal quotation marks omitted),
quoted in ROBERT J. MYERS, SOCIAL SECURITY 12 (2d ed. 1981). Professor
Mashaw has described the disability benefits program of social security as "a part
of the apparatus of the modem welfare state that touches most Americans" and
states that "it is representative of our increasingly prevalent systems of mass
justice." JERRYL. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 18 (1983). Professor Mashaw
notes that "countervailing tendencies" of caution and benevolence are built into the
program: "Congress has continuously believed the program to be both essential to
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assume crucial importance. Systems seeking to ensure the legitimacy of
their decisions therefore place special value on accuracy in determinations
of causation and harm, and they are at pains to develop rules of evidence
to ensure that goal without compromising others.3" The law of expert
witnesses becomes central for compensation systems in these circum-
stances.
This Article focuses on one type of expert witness-the claimant's or
plaintiff's treating physician, a figure whom American judges have often,
scorned but whom American regulators have increasingly embraced. Is the
treating physician the most trustworthy of witnesses in a tort or an
administrative compensation case, given that his medical opinion arises not
from the litigation itself but from an effort to diagnose and to heal his own
patient?39 Or is the treating physician the least trustworthy of witnesses,
likely possessed of personal pecuniary interests (i.e., receiving payment for
medical services and retaining the claimant as a patient) in convincing the
court that his patient should prevail? ° Is the treating physician's perfor-
a basic system of income security and an open invitation to drop out of the work
force." Id. at 20.38 For the view that those who determine eligibility for social security disability
benefits must rely only on objective information, see STONE, supra note 37, at 23.
For a classic analysis of how and why adjudication systems also pursue values
other than accuracy, see Michael J. Saks, Enhancing andRestrainingAccuracy in
Adjudication, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 243 (1988).
39 In the context of a claimant's application for social security disability and
supplemental benefits, the Ninth Circuit stated that" '[b]ecause treating physicians
are employed to cure and thus have a greater opportunity to know and observe the
patient as an individual, their opinions are given greater weight than the opinions
of other physicians."' Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2001)
(quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996)). Similarly, the
dissenting judge on a Fourth Circuit panel wrote in a black lung case'that "we
should not forget that a treating physician knows his patient as a human being
rather than as a claim number, and his opinions are generally developed in an
attempt to treat the patient rather than to provide an opinion for hire." Grizzle v.
Pickands Mather & Co., 994 F.2d 1093, 1101 (4th Cir. 1993) (Hall, J., dissent-
ing).
40 As Judge Easterbrook speculated for a Seventh Circuit panel in a recent black
lung case, "[t]reating physicians often succumb to the temptation to accommodate
their patients (and their survivors) at the expense of third parties such as insurers,
which implies attaching a discount rather than a preference to their views."
Peabody Coal Co. v. McCandless, 255 F.3d 465,469 (7th Cir. 2001). In the context
of social security disability cases, Deborah Stone wrote in 1984 that the question
of whether treating physicians are more lenient than other consulting physicians in
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mance of clinical judgment41 sufficiently scientific to be placed before
juries or accorded weight by administrative law judges, 42 or is the treating
physician's judgment inherently suspect when he or she assumes the role
of "physician-advocate"? 43 These questions highlight the law's ambiguous
regard of the treating physician; yet it is on this figure, the witness possibly
most familiar with the medical matters in controversy yet often working
beyond the realm of hard science and likely to benefit from a result that
favors the patient, that several compensation systems have pinned their
strong hopes for bolstering the accuracy-and, in time, the integrity--of
their decisions.
This Article examines how disparate compensation systems--the
common-law tort system, the social security disability benefits program,
and the federal black lung system-have pursued the common objective of
making the testimony of treating physicians increasingly important in the
resolution of medical questions. This Article also considers how these
"justifying disability awards is... difficult to answer empirically." STONE, supra
note 37, at 151. She cites pressures on treating physicians "to be strict with
disability certifications" out of a "desire to believe that medical treatment is
effective" and a "professional beliefin the value of communicating a sense of hope
to the patient." Id. On the other hand, she notes that "there is a pervasive belief
amounting to 'street wisdom' among officials of disability programs that doctors
indeed have enormous leeway in applying the concept of impairment and that there
is a bias toward leniency among treating physicians." Id. at 152.41 Clinical decision-making "is fundamentally scientific, as it is grounded in the
discipline of medical science," but it need not be based on "hard scientific studies"
and, when it takes the form of differential diagnosis, is "more in the nature of
eyewitness testimony." Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Clinical Medical Evidence of
Causation in Toxic Tort Cases: Into the Crucible of Daubert, 38 Hous. L. REV.
369,390-91 (2001). Clinical judgment "refers to a method or approach of making
judgments or decisions" when there is "no scientific research available on the
issue," or where there is such research and the clinical judgment goes beyond the
research. Daniel W. Shuman & Bruce D. Sales, The Admissibility of Expert
Testimony Based Upon Clinical Judgment and Scientific Research, 4 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 1226, 1227 (1998).
42 See Shuman & Sales, supra note 41, at 1248 (proposing, in an article written
before the Supreme Court's ruling inKumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137
(1999), a framework for admitting "pure clinical testimony for which there is no
relevant scientific literature").
43 Kevin F. Foley, Physician Advocacy and Doctor Deception a Double-Edged
Attack on Due Process, FED. LAW, July 2001, at 24, 25 (detailing concerns of an
Administrative Law Judge of the Social Security Administration that physician
witnesses may elude ethical and legal standards).
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systems work internally and suggests that systems with credible internal
workings can affect an external public policy agenda such as public health.
As shown herein, each compensation system has its own narrative of
justice--its own story of struggle and standard-setting in the pursuit of
distributive goals-and its own account of the nature of legal truth, or
accuracy, deemed necessary for the realization of the story's vision. In tort
cases involving occupational disease, the struggle is informational, with
courts rethinking the range of admissible expert testimony, and accuracy
linked to a concept of medical-professional reliability. In the Social
Security disability system, the struggle is bureaucratic, with a balance
sought between standardized and individualized administration, and
accuracy seen as a function ofboth--objective clinical data subjected to the
professional judgment of the physician closest to the claimant. In the black
lung system, the struggle is proportional, with decision makers seeking a
balanced adversarial system for parties from long-time enemy camps, and
accuracy seen as a function ofroughly equivalent opportunities to influence
a decision. Despite these differences in story and emphasis, the systems are
linked by their deference to well-reasoned treating physicians' opinions,
which are viewed as enhancing the likelihood of reaching accurate
outcomes and attaining systemic integrity.
It is thus possible to conclude that the various "treating physician rules"
used by these systems to help meet the demands of internal justice may
have the external effects of (1) adding substantially to public knowledge
about health issues, and (2) encouraging treating relationships between
claimants and physicians, thereby enhancing the possibilities of improved
health on an individual level. Compensation systems therefore have a more
layered role in public health than has been previously understood, and
scholars and others in the field of public health law should consider this
role and how it might be enriched.
I. SELF-CORRECTION IN THE LAW OF EXPERTS
AND THE IMPACT ON TORT
In four decisions over the past nine years, a united Supreme Court has
sparked a "revolution" in the law of expert opinion testimony." The Court
lit the fire in 1993 in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,4" a
44 David L. Faigmian, The Law's Scientific Revolution: Reflections and Rumi-
nations on the Law's Use ofExperts in Year Seven of the Revolution, 57 WASH. &
LEEL. REv. 661 (2000).
45Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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personal injury action in which the Court declared that trial judges
performing their function as gatekeepers of expert testimony under the
Federal Rules of Evidence "must ensure that any and all scientific
testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable." ' 6 The
Court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded Frye v. United
States,7 the leading federal case on expert testimony.4" Frye was an
appellate decision that for seventy years had "reflected a general 'hands-
off process towards expert evidence."49 Interpreting Rule 702 to mandate
significantjudicial involvement, theDaubert Court articulated several non-
definitive indicia of reliability, including whether the expert's underlying
methodology or technique had been or could be tested; whether it had been
subjected to peer review; whether it had a known or potential rate of error;
and whether and to what degree the methodology or technique had been
accepted within the relevant scientific community."0 In subsequent cases,
the Court identified "abuse of discretion" as the standard of review of a
trial court's ruling on admissibility of expert testimony,5' extended
Daubert's reliability and relevance requirements to all expert witnesses in
trials governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence,52 and held that an
appellate court reversing a trial court's admission of expert testimony on
Daubert grounds could forego remand and dismiss the action.5
Commentators trace these decisions to judicial concern over "lax
threshold standards of admissibility for expertise" associatedwithpractices
of some lower courts in the 1970s and 1980s.1' Triggered by a perception
46 Id. at 589.
47 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
41 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
49 Frank Tuerkheimer, The Daubert Case and its Aftermath: A Shot-Gun
Wedding of Technology andLaw in the Supreme Court, 51 SYRACUsEL. REv. 803,
812 (2001).
50 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
51 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141 (1997).
52 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).
53 Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440,457 (2000).
54 D. Michael Risinger, Defining the "Task at Hand": Non-Science Forensic
ScienceAfterKumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 57 WASH. &LEEL.REv. 767 (2000);
see also Peter David Blanck & Heidi M. Berven, Evidence of Disability After
Daubert, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 16, 30 (1999) (noting that "the Daubert
decision was meant to keep 'junk science' out of court by requiring judges to
function as gatekeepers who admit scientific evidence found to be valid, relevant,
and reliable"). Discussing the context of Daubert, Professor Eggen references a
segment of the legal community who in the 1990s "claimed that vast amounts of
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that "many experts came from disciplines in which consensus had replaced
rigorous study,"' the Daubert quartet spurred "a major transformation in
the way federal courts... respond to scientific experts." 6 The central
change was the enhanced gatekeeping role of the trial judge, who hence-
forth would be "expected to bring reasoned principles to the task of
deciding which scientists may enter [the gate]." 7 At the heart of the Court's
enterprise, then, was a revitalized concept that trial judges must "exercise
the judgment necessary to do justice."58
For the uninitiated, Jason Daubert was born with limb reduction birth
defects, which he attributed to his in utero exposure to a drug that his
mother took for morning sickness.5 9 Jason and his guardian ad litem sued
the manufacturer of Bendectin for damages.' Based on the opinion of a
well-credentialed physician-epidemiologist, the manufacturer's motion for
summary judgment argued that no reasonable jury could find that
Bendectin caused the child's injuries because no study had linked
Bendectin to human birth defects.61 Jason responded with affidavits of his
own experts, who relied on test tube and live animal studies as well as
pharmacological studies and a re-analysis of existing epidemiological
unreliable, so-called scientific evidence was being admitted in personal injury trials
.... [T]hey declared any theories not receiving general acceptance in the relevant
scientific discipline to be scientifically invalid and unreliable." Eggen, supra note
41, at 409-10 (citing, inter alia, PETER J. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK
SCIENCE IN THE CouRTROOM (1991)). She states that the Daubert Court, "both
agree[ing] and disagree[ing]" with this line of thinking, "sought a balance of
extremes" by rejecting the general acceptance test and "sweeping characterizations
of categories of evidence" while accepting the need for "strict scrutiny" in ruling
on the admissibility of expert testimony. Id. at 410. Discussing admission of
forensic identification science, Michael J. Saks traces the problem of inadequate
judicial scrutiny of proffered expert testimony to the early twentieth century cases
in which the proffers were first made. Michael J. Saks, Banishing Ipse Dixit: The
Impact of Kumho Tire on Forensic Identification Science, 57 WASH. &LEE L. REV.
879, 888 (2000).
55 Faigman, supra note 44, at 664.
56 DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN
THE LAW 60 (1999).
571Id. at 61.
581 Id. at 60.
59 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 571 (S.D. Cal.
1989), vacated by 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
6 See id. at 570. Another plaintiff, Eric Schuler, and his guardian ad litem sued
the same defendant on the same grounds. See id.61Id. at 575.
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studies.62 The trial judge refused to admit the opinion testimony of Jason's
experts, citing precedent that made admissibility dependent on general
acceptabilityofthe expert's underlying scientific methodology.63 The Ninth
Circuit affirmed.64
Referring to the text and drafting history of Rule 702,65 the Supreme
Court held that the Rule superseded the seventy year old leading precedent,
and that "general acceptability" was not a prerequisite to admissibility.66 To
this extent, Daubert was a victory for plaintiffs, particularly with its
references to "the 'liberal thrust' of the Federal Rules and their 'general
approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to "opinion" testimony.' 67 iiOn
the other hand, the Court found that Rule 702 imposed on trial judges an
obligation to enforce limits on admissibility of scientific expert testimony.68
The Court stated that the reference in Rule 702 to "scientific knowledge"
meant that scientific expert testimony must be based on what is known and
thus that the reasoning of an expert opinion must be reliable.69 Most
commentators agree that the effect of this reliability requirement, particu-
larly as embellished by the Court's non-definitive yet crucially important
indicia of reliability, has been "to raise the bar for admission" of scientific
evidence.70
But what of expert testimony addressing matters other than the kind of
"hard science" that was at issue in Daubert?71 In Kumho Tire Co. v.
62Id. at 573-75.
63 Id. at 572, 576; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,
583-84 (1993).
64Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 1991).
65 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588.
66Id. at 589.
67Id. at 588 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169
(1988)).68Id. at 589.
69Id. at 589-90. In addition, the Court held that the testimony must be able to
assist the trier of fact in the resolution of a disputed issue and thus must be relevant
to the matter at hand. Id. at 591-92.70 Risinger, supra note 54, at 769.
71 Professor Eggenuses "hard science" to refer to "epidemiological, toxicologi-
cal, or other laboratory studies." Eggen, supra note 41, at 373 n.20. See also Note,
Navigating Uncertainty: Gatekeeping in the Absence ofHard Science, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 1467, 1468 n.6 (2000) (" '[H]ard science' . . . describe[s] scientific
methodologies characterized by careful quantification and rigorous testability. In
the context of medical causation, the reference is primarily to population studies
and laboratory experimentation, the methodologies associated with epidemiology
and toxicology, respectively.").
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Carmichael,2 the Court addressed admissibility requirements for expert
testimony using "technical, or other specialized knowledge"73 under Rule
702. The plaintiff in a tire failure case planned to call an engineer whose
testimony was not "scientific" in the Daubert sense but certainly "techni-
cal" or "specialized."74 The Court held that the Daubert decision's
requirements of reliability and relevance applied not only to the testimony
of scientific experts but to all expert testimony under the Federal Rules,
including "nonscientific or experience-based expert testimony."'75 The
Court emphasized that a trial court's assessment of reliability was to be
"flexible" and could employ the reliability factors found in Daubert or
other factors appropriate to the facts of a particular case.76 The trial court's
responsibility would be to determine that the expert, "whether basing
testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the
courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice
of an expert in the relevant field."77 Turning to the facts, the Court upheld
the trial judge's ruling against admissibility: the judge reasonably had
found that the engineer's testimony was based on a theory that could not be
supported by reference to the Daubert indicia or to any other "reasonable
reliability criteria." 8 In effect, the engineer's proffered testimony was "too
subjective."79 Kumho Tire prompted further commentary that the "net
72Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
73FED. R. EviD. 702.
74Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 142-43.
75 Eggen, supra note 41, at 385. In Kumho Tire, the Court explicitly stated that
"no one denies that an expert might draw a conclusion from a set of observations
based on extensive and specialized experience." Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 156.
76 Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 150. Commentators point out:
It would be amistake... to read Kumho as saying that the trial court simply
may ignore the Daubert factors in non-science cases. The Court noted that
"a trial court should consider the specific factors identified in Daubert
where they are reasonable measures of the reliability of expert testimony."
In a concurring opinion, Justices Scalia, O'Connor, and Thomas added that
the discretion enjoyed by the trial court does not include the discretion to
abandon the gatekeeping function or to perform it inadequately.
Joseph Sanders & Julie Machal-Fulks, The Admissibility ofDifferentialDiagnosis
Testimony to Prove Causation in Toxic Tort Cases: The Interplay ofAdjective and
Substantive Law, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2001, at 107, 117 (footnote
omitted). See also FED. R. EviD. 702; FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note
(referencing Daubert and Kumho Tire).
'n Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152.
7'1d. at 158.
79 Eggen, supra note 41, at 386.
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impact [of the Court's decisions] is to constrict, not expand, the admission
of expert evidence.""0 Many praised the Court's rethinking of this segment
of evidence law as overdue;8' others doubted the ability of the judicial
process to engage meaningfully in the required scrutiny.'
In its latest decision on expert testimony, Weisgram v. Marley Co., 3 a
unanimous Court referred to "the exacting standards of reliability such
evidence must meet,"4 thus confirmingthe Court's unmistakable intent that
trial judges engage in "a powerful new way of thinking about evidence of
the real world,"8" and that they attend carefully to "drawing the line
between valid empirical knowledge and value-driven empirical specula-
tion." 6 Through these cases, the Court has sought to shore up the accuracy
and credibility of outcomes and, by extension, the legitimacy of the tort
system itself, which had increasingly come under fire. 7 By imposing new
bounds on admissibility and new duties on trial judges, the Court recog-
nized, as one commentator has noted in a slightly different context, "that
the fundamental source ofjudicial legitimacy in our system is the giving of
reasons for important decisions." 8
But questions still abound, particularly in occupational health cases in
which "hard science" establishing causation is lacking, and plaintiffs
80 Tuerkheimer, supra note 49, at 818.
81 Michael J. Saks, The Aftermath of Daubert An Evolving Jurisprudence of
Expert Evidence, 40 JuRIMETlIcS J. 229,241 (2000) (approving the Court's work
in this area as launching evidence law on "a voyage worthy of a new century,"
despite the need for "certain course corrections").82 Brewer, supra note 30, at 1679-81.
83 Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440 (2000).
84Id. at 455.
15 Saks, supra note 54, at 898.
86 Faigman, supra note 44, at 671.
87 See, e.g., Review and Outlook: The Law Disfigured, WALL ST. J., June 24,
1999, at A22 (addressing breast implant litigation and a report released by the
National Academy of Science's Institute of Medicine finding no link between
silicone-gel implants and diseases such as cancer and lupus). The Journal
lambasted the tort system for permitting the implant cases to have proceeded at all,
and argued that "[a]t all levels of American society, especially business, the idea
that American courtrooms strive toward justice is no longer taken seriously." Id.
For studies of the breast implant cases and their implications, see Richard A.
Nagareda, Outrageous Fortune and the Criminalization ofMass Torts, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 1121, 1137-45 (1998); Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Scientific
Authority: The Breast Implant Litigation and Beyond, 86 VA. L. REV. 801 (2000).
88 Saks, supra note 54, at 900 (criticizing Mitchell v. United States, Crim. No.
96-409-1 (E.D. Pa. 2000), a post-Kumho Tire case involving expert testimony
regarding fingerprint evidence, for not upholding this duty).
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proffer clinical medical evidence in the form of a treating physician's
opinion. A treating physician can be either a nonspecialist or a specialist
whose "primary role is the examination, diagnosis, and treatment of
patients." 9 This physician's usual role in a case involving occupational
disease differs substantially from the role of the experts who testified in
Daubert about Bendectin. The latter addressed general causation, i.e.,
whether a chemical or other substance had the capacity to cause the
plaintiff's illness, whereas treating physicians focus on specific causation,
i.e., whether an exposure has caused harm in a specific case.90 The treating
physician is often familiar with medical studies, if any, pertaining to
general causation, but plaintiffs rely on this witness primarily to furnish
clinical medical evidence based on "knowledge, experience, and perfor-
mance ofa differential diagnosis."91 Thus, a treating physician's opinion "is
more in the nature of eyewitness testimony."'92 Because his or her
"methodologies do not normally rely on scientific analysis in the same
manner as the testimony addressed in the Daubert case,"93 but can more
closely resemble the process of elimination employed by the engineer in
Kumho Tire,94 a question inevitably arises: can a treating physician's
practice of clinical reasoning hold up under the Court's demand of
evidentiary reliability?
The fundamental datum for courts that have admitted the testimony of
a treating physician is the physician's performance of a differential
etiology--or, as the law more frequently calls it, a differential diagnosis."
89 Mary Sue Hinifin et al., Reference Guide on Medical Testimony, in
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIc EVIDENCE 439,449 (Federal Judicial Ctr. ed.,
2d ed. 2000).
90 For an explanation of this distinction, see Note, supra note 71, at 1469.
9' Eggen, supra note 41, at 393.
92Id. at 391.
931d. at 387.
94 Sanders & Machal-Fulks, supra note 76, at 117-18 (noting that "[m]uch of
this testimony was the engineering equivalent of a differential diagnosis").
95 The medical definition of "differential diagnosis" concerns identification of
disease: "The term [is] used by physicians to refer to the process of determining
which of two or more diseases with similar symptoms and signs the patient is
suffering from, by means of comparing the various competing diagnostic
hypotheses with the clinical findings." Hinifin et al., supra note 89, at 481. In the
legal context, lawyers, judges, and expert witnesses use "differential diagnosis"
interchangeably with "differential etiology" to refer to identification of the cause
of disease or other harm, "differential etiology" is "[a] term used on occasion...
to describe the investigation and reasoning that leads to a determination of external
causation, sometimes more specifically described by the witness or court as a
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Differential diagnosis in this sense refers to a multi-step process of
reaching a medical conclusion:
First, the physician conducts a comparative analysis of the patient's
illness in relation to known patterns of disease. Second, the physician
applies certain diagnostic criteria to the patient to determine the probabil-
ity that the diagnosis is one particular illness out of several.... Third, the
physician undertakes a cause-and-effect analysis to determine if the
appearance and progress of the disease in the patient is or has been
consistent with generally known physiological and pathological informa-
tion regarding the disease.
96
Thus, "differential diagnosis in the clinical medical setting is a combination
of scientific information and experience."97 Physicians performing a
differential diagnosis generally use standard diagnostic techniques,
including physical examinations, medical histories, and laboratory tests, all
with the goal of "careful consideration of alternative causes,"9" and
sometimes with "less than full information." 99 Is this a methodology that
can be found "reliable" under Daubert and Kumho Tire?"'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has said yes.
In Westberry v. Gislaved GummiAB, 0 a worker in a window factory sued
the manufacturer of a product used in making windows. The product was
a rubber gasket that the manufacturer coated with talc as a lubricant. 2 By
using the gaskets, the plaintiff became exposed to airborne talc and
developed sinus problems that eventually resulted in a number of
surgeries."°3 The plaintiff proffered testimony of his treating physician
whose opinion, based on a differential diagnosis supported by the temporal
proximity between exposure and the symptoms, was that the talc exposure
caused the sinus problems. 10 4 The defendant objected on grounds that the
process of identifying external causes by a process of elimination." Id.96 Eggen, supra note 41, at 392 (footnotes omitted).
971Id. at418.
98 In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 758 (3d Cir. 1994).
99Id. at 759.
,00 "[Ain expert's testimony is admissible so long as the process or technique
the expert used in formulating the opinion is reliable." Id. at 742 (citing Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993)).
10' Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 1999).
102 Id. at 260.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 262.
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physician's opinion lacked support in any published or unpublished
scientific studies and that clinical tests had not produced clear proof.'o The
Fourth Circuit ruled that the expert testimony was admissible under the
framework of Daubert and Kumho Tire.' 6
The court gave full recognition to differential diagnosis as "a standard
scientific technique of identifying the cause of a medical problem by
eliminating the likely causes until the most probable one is isolated."'0 7 The
court noted that this technique "consists of a testable hypothesis, has been
peer reviewed, contains standards for controlling its operation, is generally
accepted, and is used outside the judicial context."'0 8 Moreover, "the
overwhelming majority of the courts of appeals that have addressed the
issue have held that a medical opinion on causation based upon a reliable
differential diagnosis is sufficiently valid to satisfy the first prong of the
Rule 702 inquiry."'"
Even assuming the validity of the treating physician's diagnostic
technique, was his performance of the technique adequate? The defendant
maintained that the differential diagnosis was flawed because the treating
physician did not convincingly "rule in" talc as a possible cause of the
illness, and because the physician had failed to "rule out" every other
possible cause." 0 On whether the physician had done enough to "rule in"
talc, the court noted that the parties did not dispute that "inhalation of high
levels of talc irritates mucous membranes,"' and that plaintiff's testimony
was adequate to support a conclusion that he came into contact with "high
concentrations of airborne talc.""' Moreover, it was permissible for the
trial judge to consider the temporal proximity of the plaintiff's exposure to
"the onset and worsening" of his health problems.I" On the question of
1051d.
106 Id.
107 Id. The court quoted a Third Circuit case, which in turn quoted from a stan-
dard reference work: "'[differential diagnosis is defined for physicians as "the
determination of which of two or more diseases with similar symptoms is the one
from which the patient is suffering, by a systematic comparison and contrasting of
the clinical findings."' " Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Kannankeril v.
Terminix Int'l, Inc., 128 F.3d 802, 807 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting STEDMAN'S
MEDICAL DICrIONARY 428 (25th ed. 1990))).
' Id. at 263 (quoting Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 154-55 (3d
Cir. 1999)).
10 Id.
0.1d.
"Id. at 264.
112 Id.
"' Id. at 265.
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other possible causes, the court ruled that a differential diagnosis is
unreliable and thus inadmissible when it is "so lacking that it cannot
provide a reliable basis for an opinion,"'1 4 although arguments about
alternative causes usually pertain to the weight rather than the admissibility
of a differential diagnosis." 5 The court's application ofthese principles was
sparse, but it concluded that the treating physician had sufficiently
explained his exclusion of other potential causes.'
6
Westberry makes surprisingly little of the fact that the expert whose
testimony was at issue was the plaintiff's treating physician. Perhaps the
significance was already clear. In an earlier case involving the admissibility
ofa treating physician's differential diagnosis absent epidemiological data,
the Fourth Circuit held that the methodologies of the plaintiffs treating
physicians and other experts were reliable under Daubert "in light of the
medical community's daily use of the same methodologies in diagnosing
patients.""n 7 This statement suggested that the importance of the treating
physician's opinion is not that the opinion is necessarily wiser or inherently
more accurate, but that it is reliable when it emerges from a treating
relationship in which a customary, professionally credible mode of analysis
is employed to iddress medical problems. This emphasis on the process of
medical reasoning means that it is the "deliberative" treating physician
whose differential diagnosis has worth in the context of tort."'
The focus on a physician's mode of analysis suggests, of course, that
not all performances of differential diagnosis will pass the test of reliabil-
114 Id.
I1Is/Id.
116 Id. at 266.
"7 Benedi v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 66 F.3d 1378, 1384 (4th Cir. 1995).
118 As Charles Nesson has written perceptively of the thought process of the
"treating doctor":
To be sure, the doctor is not saying he is absolutely or scientifically certain
of the diagnosis, but to expect him to be so would discourage treatment in
most medical situations. Certainty is a false god here, as elsewhere in
judicial proof. A qualified medical diagnostician is familiar with the
scientific and medical literature. He assesses the significance of experi-
ments and studies, not in the technical scientific sense of the statistician, but
in an intuitive way. He anticipates what the scientist would be able to prove
if he could structure the perfect study, the perfect experiment. Lacking
complete information, the diagnostician gives his best judgment By its
nature this judgment is not, ofitself, scientificproof, but it may nonetheless
constitute legal proof.
Charles Nesson, Agent Orange Meets the Blue Bus: Facpfnding at the Frontiers
of Knowledge, 66 B.U. L. REv. 521, 528-29 (1986) (footnote omitted).
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ity. For example, in another Fourth Circuit case, Cooper v. Smith &
Nephew, Inc.,' 9 a plaintiff suedthe manufacturer of a device used in spinal
fusion surgeries and proffered the testimony of a non-treating, consulting
physician. The trial court rejected the expert's differential diagnosis as
unreliable under Daubert and Kumho Tire.2' One aspect of the expert's
unreliability was his failure to reach a diagnosis in the manner of a
deliberative treating physician. Unlike the plaintiff's treating physician,
who on the basis of considerable medical literature had concluded that the
plaintiff's smoking habit had some bearing on his spinal problems, the
consulting expert ignored that potential cause.' In addition, the expert's
objections to the safety of the challenged device were no more than
"boilerplate."'" Departing from his normal way of treating his own
patients, the consulting physician formed his opinion about the plaintiff
without conducting a physical examination, and he neglected to speak with
physicians who had treated the plaintiff." The expert thus failed to employ
"'in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the
practice of an expert in the relevant field."' 2 The Fourth Circuit's analysis
amounted to a damning comparison of a tunnel-visioned litigation
consultant with a deliberative clinical practitioner, and it signaled that the
"intellectual rigor" required of a credible differential diagnosis will be that
of a treating physician.
But questions remain. One is whether treating physicians, many of
whom lack experience as witnesses in legal proceedings, can be expected
to meet the law's ideal of a "deliberative diagnostician." Is clinical
reasoning adaptable to the way lawyers think? Are physicians, even in the
19 Cooper v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 2001).
"I Id. at 203.
21 d. at 202.
'nid.
121 Id. at 203.
'24 Id. (quoting Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999)). In
another case against the same defendant, Fitzgerald v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., No.
00-1145, 11 Fed. Appx. 335, 2001 WL 648610 (4th Cir. June 12, 2001) (unpub-
lished), the plaintiff proffered testimony of a non-treating, consulting physician
whose methodology was also found unreliable by the trial court. Affirming the
exclusion ofthe physician's testimony, the Fourth Circuitnoted the expert's failure
to review a large number of the plaintiff's medical records, any ofherx-rays, or her
deposition; failure to examine the plaintiff; and failure to speak with her or her
treating physicians. Id. at 340, 2001 WL 648610, at *4. In effect, in failing to
engage in the mode of analysis of a deliberative treating physician, the consulting
physician rendered an opinion that lacked the "intellectual rigor" of the profession.
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context of performing a differential diagnosis, likely to engage in the kind
of step-by-step reasoned discourse that is commonplace to lawyers and
persuasive to judges? Perhaps not. In Turner v. Iowa Fire Equipment Co.,1
25
the Eighth Circuit found that a treating physician was "more concerned
with identifying and treating [the plaintiff's] condition than he was with
identifying the specific substance that caused her condition.' 126 As a result,
the court faulted the physician for "arriv[ing] at his opinion about
[causation] more as an afterthought, in an ad hoc manner,"'" and for "not
systematically rul[ing] out all other possible causes."'1 28 As the courts
continue to develop the concept ofthe adequate differential diagnosis,' for
the ends of promoting accurate case results and enhancing the credibility
of the legal system, the risk is that some courts will hold physicians to an
unrealistic standard of "intellectual rigor."
And what sort of "intellectual rigor" is required--or possible-when
evidence of general causation is completely lacking? 3 ' Some courts require
that a physician's differential diagnosis be based on "hard scientific
studies" that pass the test ofDaubert.'3 Others take a different view, citing
"the liberal thrust of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the flexible nature of
the Daubert inquiry, and the proper roles of the judge and the jury in
evaluating the ultimate credibility of an expert's opinion."132 Any other
approach would, according to these courts, "resurrect a Frye-like bright-
line standard, not by requiring that a methodology be 'generally accepted,'
but by excluding expert testimony not backed by published (and presum-
ably peer-reviewed) studies."'33 Again, the touchstone of credibility is the
ideal of the deliberative treating physician who
[i]n the actual practice of medicine... [does] not wait for conclusive, or
even published and peer-reviewed, studies to make diagnoses to a
125 Turner v. Iowa Fire Equip. Co., 229 F.3d 1202 (8th Cir. 2000).26 Id. at 1208.
127 Id.
1281d.
129 For an interesting analysis of this objective, see generally Gary Sloboda,
Differential Diagnosis or Distortion?, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 301 (2001).
130 As stated by the Third Circuit in Heller v. Shaw Industries, Inc., 167 F.3d
146, 155 (3d Cir. 1999), "[t]he question ... is whether the expert's conclusion can
be considered reliable if it is based on scientifically valid methods, but is not based
on published studies."
131 See Eggen, supra note 41, at 394-402 (gathering Fifth Circuit cases in which
differential diagnoses are excluded in the absence of studies of the kind required
in Daubert).
132Heller, 167 F.3d at 155.
1331d.
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reasonable degree of medical certainty .... However, experience with
hundreds of patients, discussions with peers, attendance at conferences
and seminars, detailed review of a patient's family, personal, and medical
histories, and thorough physical examination are the tools of the trade,
and should suffice for the maldng of a differential diagnosis even in those
cases in which peer-reviewed studies do not exist to confirm the diagnosis
of the physician.
13 4
In sum, the revolution in the law of expert evidence has had far-
reaching effect. The treating physician plays a major role not only as an
expert in litigation, particularly in cases involving occupational injury and
disease, but increasingly as a standard of reasonableness in determining the
quality of a differential diagnosis for purposes of admissibility. However,
by requiring that physicians provide lawyerly reasons for their conclusions,
the law may be asking too much of professionals whose training is foreign
from that of attorneys and judges. Perhaps the law's insistence on detailed
medical reasoning is an indirect way of acknowledging the legal system's
need to monitor its own reasoning more effectively. In this sense, Daubert
and Kumho Tire are not simply about the reasoning of experts; they are
about the intellectual rigor of judges.
Intellectual rigor, whether of doctors or judges, has a connection to
public health. The tort system's pursuit of accurate results can aid public
health initiatives over time. A plaintiffs verdict in Westberry may or may
not deter gasket manufacturers from using a certain lubricant, but the
verdict does become known to regulators, perhaps signaling-in conjunc-
tion with other information-a need for investigation and even regulatory
action. Moreover, recognition of differential diagnosis as a reliable
methodology may prompt other occupational health claims, particularly
where, as in Westberry, industry has had no incentive to study the impact
of particular exposures in the workplace. Claims of this kind may prompt
the kind of industry studies that were missing in Westberry, and perhaps
government studies as well.
II. SOCIAL SECURITY DISABiLITy:
THE TREATING PHYSICIAN AND "CONTROLLING WEIGHT"
This Article now shifts from civil trials, which are subject to the
Federal Rules of Evidence, to federal administrative proceedings of the
134 Id. The Heller court noted that the Federal Rules of Evidence "recognize as
much." Id.
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Social Security Administration ("SSA"), in which juries play no part and
the Federal Rules of Evidence have no applicability.'35 The SSA's
Administrative Law Judges adjudicate claims for Disability Insurance
Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act and claims for Supple-
mental Security Income under Title XVI of the same Act,136 and their daily
fare is a wealth of conflicting medical and vocational evidence. 37 In a non-
adversarial setting, the Administrative Law Judge ("AL") "operates in an
investigatory mode, seeking out evidence, conducting an oral hearing, and
ultimately deciding the case." ' The ALJ's concern in these cases is far
less with the admissibility of evidence than with the proper weighing of
evidence that has been received into the record. This distinction between
evidentiary issues in civil and administrative proceedings is well accepted.
As early as 1941, the Supreme Court declared, "it has long been settled that
the technical rules for the exclusion of evidence applicable injury trials do
not apply to proceedings before federal administrative agencies in the
absence of a statutory requirement that such rules are to be observed."'3
Several years later, in 1945, while contemplating the adjudicatory model
of agency action that would become Section 554 of the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA"), the drafters recognized that an administrative
hearing is comparable, not to a jury trial, but to "an equity proceeding in
the courts" 140 and that evidentiary rules designed to protect a "lay jury...
from improper influence"1 41 are simply unnecessary. Thus, although
individual agencies may (and often do) promulgate rules addressing agency
procedures and evidence and although agencies subject to the APA have
135 For a survey of agencies' evidentiary practices and rules, see Richard J.
Pierce, Use of the Federal Rules ofEvidence in Federal Agency Adjudications, 39
ADMiN. L. REv. 1 (1987).
13642 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (2000) (disability insurance benefits); id. §§ 138 1-
1383f (supplemental security income).
137 For a description of the range of evidence in such a case, see generally
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
'3 8 JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 39 (1983).
139 Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Adm'r, 312 U.S. 126, 155 (1941).
140 Underwood v. Elkay Mining, Inc., 105 F.3d 946, 951 (4th Cir. 1997)
(quoting S. Doc. No. 79-248, at 208 (1946)).
1411d. (quoting S. Doc. No. 79-248, at 208 (1946)). Professors Davis and Pierce
have pointed out that the law's means of ensuring "that agency findings are based
only on reliable evidence" are the requirement that agencies supply reasons for
their findings of fact and the availability of judicial review of agency action. 2
KENNETH CULP DAVIS &RICHARDJ. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
127 (3d ed. 1994).
42 See Richardson, 402 U.S. at 400 (quoting the agency regulation on the ALJ's
duty to inquire fully into the issues and to receive relevant evidence).
[VOL. 90
2001-2002] TREATING PHYSICIANS AS EXPERT WITNESSES
the power to exclude "irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious
evidence," 43 administrative agencies as a general matter resolve disputes
and adjudicate claims "through use of an evidentiary system that can be
described in simple, pragmatic terms.""' The ALJ admits all evidence with
any arguable materiality to the issues, and then he or she determines "the
relative probative value of the admitted evidence.' 45
But what substantive goals are at stake in the disability program? The
Social Security Act "provides for the payment of insurance benefits to
persons who have contributed to the program and who suffer from a
physical or mental disability."'" In the words of one U.S. magistrate judge,
these claims are often "made by ordinary people in desperate circum-
stances.', 147 A compensable disability is "any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment' 1 48 which prevents the claimant from
engaging "in substantial gainful activity"'49 and is "expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
of not less than 12 months."'5 0 The impairment must arise from "anatomi-
cal, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable
by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques."''
Benefits are paid only if the claimant's impairments "are of such severity
that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering
14' 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2000).
144 DAVIs &PIERCE, supra note 141, at 117.
145 Id.
146 Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987) (citing 42 U.S.C. §
423(a)(1)(D) (1982)).
'47 Thomas P. Smith & PatrickM. Fahey, SomePoints on Litigating Titlelland
Title XVI Social Security Disability Claims in United States District Court, 14
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 243, 272 (1994). Linda G. Mills writes that the disability
insurance benefits and supplemental security income programs
are what people rely on if they become too sick to work. Both rich and poor
need and use these safety nets. Social security disability applicants include
a diverse cross-section of Americans: the parents ofjudges, the children of
the rich and famous, and the otherwise faceless poor. As might be expected,
a disproportionate number of poor women and people of color apply for
these benefits. The bulk of applicants, however, are working people, people
who, after years of on-the-job physical and emotional strain, become
incapable of meeting the demands of full-time employment
MILLS, supra note 4, at 2 (citation omitted).
'4"42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2000).
' Id. § 423(d)(1)(B).
'sold. § 423(d)(1)(A).
151Id. § 423(d)(3).
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his age, education and work experience, engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy."'5 2 The
concept of disability thus "consists of both medical and vocational
components.'
153
Originally proposed in the effort that led to the Social Security Act of
1935, but not "even haltingly begun until 1950,"'15 the disability insurance
benefits program "did not become a full-fledged early-retirement benefits
scheme until 1960."' Professor Mashaw describes the program as the
embodiment "ofa complicated new social goal-cautious benevolence."
' 15 6
According to Mashaw, the program developed in part on a model ofjustice
conceived as "bureaucratic rationality," 157 that is, the cost-effective
administrative implementation of a legislative goal. 58 Since the Social
Security Act's goal is to "pay disability benefits to eligible persons,"'59
administrative justice consists of "accurate decision making carried on
through processes appropriately rationalized to take account of costs."' 60 A
competing model of administrative justice is a "moral judgment model"
associated with the fair adjudication of each claim.' This model not only
seeks accurate outcomes but also "views decision making as value
defining;"'62 from this perspective, disability adjudication is meant to probe
"not just who did what, but who is to be preferred, all things considered,
when interests, and the values to which they can be relevantly connected,
conflict."' 63 These models co-exist in some tension, each assuming
dominance in different phases of the administrative process."6 Mashaw's
152 Id. § 423(d)(2)(A).
"I Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2001).
154 MASHAW, supra note 138, at 34.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 35.
,157 JerryL. Mashaw, LessonsfortheAdministration of Workers' Compensation
from the Social Security Disability Insurance Program, in NEW PERSPECTIVES IN
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 97, 101 (John F. Burton, Jr. ed., 1988).
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
1611d. at 103.
162 id
163Id.
164 See id. at 104-05. Another commentator similarly discusses "the two con-
flicting goals of the Social Security Administration: objective, general, and
consistent determinations combined with individualized assessments." Rachel
Schneider, Comment, A Rolefor the Courts: TreatingPhysician Evidence in Social
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bureaucratic rationality model helps explain the genesis of the SSA's five-
step sequential framework for determinations of disability,165 a controlled
analytic process designed to "allow the most straightforward cases to be
decided quickly and efficiently on medical grounds alone"' and intended
overall to produce "consistent, standardized decisions."' 67 The agency's
evolving treating physician doctrine, on the other hand, has been viewed by
some as reflecting the competing model that strives for contextualized
judgments.
1 68
The story of the SSA's use of treating physician testimony is one of
conflict and change. In 1991 (two years, incidentally, before the Daubert
revolution began in the federal courts), the SSA modified its procedures for
adjudicating disability claims, particularly its practices of weighing medical
evidence. 69 This was another action that some thought overdue. Without
an agency regulation governing medical evidence in the 1970s and 1980s,
the SSA had engaged in a highly publicized battle with the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit over the weighing of treating physician
Security Determinations, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 391,415 (1996).
165 The first two steps involve threshold determinations that the claimant is
not presently engaged in substantial gainful activity and has an impairment
or combination of impairments which significantly limits his physical or
mental ability to do basic work activities. In the third step, the medical
evidence of the claimant's impairment(s) is compared to a list of impair-
ments presumed severe enough to preclude any gainful activity. If the
claimant's impairment matches or is equal to one of the listed impairments,
he qualifies for benefits without further inquiry. Ifthe person cannot qualify
under the listings, the evaluation proceeds to the fourth and fifth steps. At
these steps, analysis is made of whether the person can do his own past
work or any other work that exists in the national economy, in view of his
age, education, and work experience. If he cannot do his past work or other
work, the claimant qualifies for benefits.
Loza v. Apfel, 219 F.3d 378, 390 (5th Cir. 2000) (footnotes and citations omitted).
16 FRANK S. BLOCH, DISABILITY DETERMINATION: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRO-
CESS AND THE ROLE OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL 7 (1992) (discussing steps two and
three).
167 Schneider, supra note 164, at 395. The Supreme Court has upheld different
parts of the sequence of steps. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987)
(upholding second step); Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983) (upholding
medical-vocational guidelines followed in step five).
'( Schneider, supra note 164, at 415-16.
'69 Standards for Consultative Examinations and Existing Medical Evidence, 56
Fed. Reg. 36,932 (Dep't Health & Human Servs. Aug. 1, 1991) [hereinafter 1991
Standards].
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evidence. 170 For years, the Second Circuit had imposed a standard that was
quite deferential to treating physicians,171 and the agency had resisted the
standard to the point of non-acquiescence. 72 By 1987, the SSA formally
'70 See generally Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by
FederalAdministrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679,701-04 (1989) (detailing SSA
refusal to follow Second Circuit case law on weight to be given treating physicians
in social security disability adjudications, except in specific cases before the court);
Robert J. Axelrod, Comment, The Politics ofNonacquiescence: The Legacy of
Stieberger v. Sullivan, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 765, 776-778 (1994) (same).71E.g., Gold v. Sec'y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 463 F.2d 38, 42 (2d Cir.
1972). In Schisler v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 1986), the court summarized
its rule:
The rule, which has been the law of this circuit for at least five years,
provides that a treating physician's opinion on the subject of medical
disability, i.e., diagnosis and nature and degree of impairment, is (i) binding
on the fact-finder unless contradicted by substantial evidence; and (ii)
entitled to some extra weight because the treating physician is usually more
familiar with a claimant's medical condition than are other physicians,
although resolution of genuine conflicts between the opinion of the treating
physician, with its extra weight, and any substantial evidence to the contrary
remains the responsibility of the fact-finder.
The Schisler court also noted "'that there is no requirement that the [treating]
physician's medical testimony be supported by objective clinical or laboratory
findings."' Id. at 82 n.2 (quoting Bluvand v. Heckler, 730 F.2d 886, 893 (2d Cir.
1984)).
172 See Stiebergerv. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), vacated sub
nom. Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986). In this litigation, a district
court ordered the Secretary of HHS to apply the Second Circuit's treatingphysician
rule, but a Second Circuit panel vacated the order. The panel discussed Social
Security Rulings ("SSRs") showing that the agency was not complying with the
Second Circuit's treating physician rule. One SSR provided that "other things
being equal, the fact that a physician treated a claimant wil increase the weight
accorded to that physician's opinion, but... [the SSR did] not mention that the
treating physician's opinion is binding unless contradicted by substantial evi-
dence." Bowen, 801 F.2d at 32. Another SSR indicated that "a treating physician's
views sometimes ought not to be given controlling weight because that physician
'might have been leaning over backwards to support the application for disability
benefits."' Id. (quoting Soc. Sec. Ruling 83-6c (1983)). As explained in the third
of another series of Second Circuit cases involving the agency's non-acquiescence
in this context:
[T]he result of HHS's non-acquiescence was that claimants relying on the
opinions oftreatingphysicians were routinely denied benefits at the agency
level. They were thus forced to take their cases one-by-one to the federal
courts, which routinely remanded with instructions to apply the rule.
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proposed its own regulation. In 1991, the SSA promulgated a final rule that
was considerably less liberal than the Second Circuit's rule but still
deferential to the opinions of treating physicians. 7 ' The Second Circuit
upheld the rules in 1993."74
In brief, the SSA rules provide that Administrative Law Judges in
disability cases should give "controlling weight' 75 to the "medical
opinion"7" of a treating physician if the opinion is "'well-supported' by
'medically acceptable' clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques [and
is] 'not inconsistent' with the other 'substantial evidence' in [the] case
record.""' If an ALJ decides that controlling weight is not warranted, then
the ALJ must supply specific reasons for that decision.' 7 Even then, the
ALJ must assign weight to the treating physician's opinion by consulting
a list of factors, including the length, nature, and extent of the treating
relationship, the evidence that supports the physician's opinion, the
opinion's consistency with the record as a whole, and whether the treating
physician is a specialist.
7 1
However, HHS never sought Supreme Court review of any of these many
decisions. It thus appeared that HHS was non-acquiescing in the treating
physician rule not as a matter ofprinciple-which could have been resolved
by seeking review in the Supreme Court-but as a means of discouraging
claimants who relied upon the rule. This creation of unnecessary legal
hurdles was understandably perceived as an abuse of process.
Schisler v. Sullivan, 3 F.3d 563, 565 (2d Cir. 1993).
'7 Schisler, 3 F.3d at 567.
' 74 Id. at 568-69.
171 Title II and XVI: Giving Controlling Weight to Treating Source Medical
Opinions, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,490 (Dep't Health & Human Servs. July 2, 1996)
(notice of ruling) [hereinafter Giving Controlling Weight]. To give controlling
weight means to adopt. Id.
176 Id. A medical opinion is an opinion about "the nature and severity of an
individual's impairment(s)." Id.
' 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (2002). In upholding the regulations, the Second
Circuit noted that the social security legislation itself provides that "an impairment
must be 'demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques."' Schisler, 3 F.3d at 568 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382c(a)(3)(D),
423(d)(3) (2000)).
178 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (2002). In two recent social security disability
cases, Myers v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 617 (5th Cir. 2001), and Drapeau v. Massanari,
255 F.3d 1211 (10th Cir. 2001), reviewing courts reversed ALl decisions that had
failed to provide specific reasons for rejecting a medical report by a claimant's
treating physician.
179 Giving Controlling Weight, supra note 175, at 34,491.
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Two of the purposes of the agency's rule were to encourage greater
uniformity of disability adjudications within the SSA system18° and to
facilitate accurate outcomes.' Ensuring uniformity of a sprawling
bureaucracy's adjudication was seen as a public duty.182 Accuracy was a
goal informed by the agency's conviction that "treating source evidence
tends to have a special intrinsic value by virtue of the treating source's
relationship with the claimant,"'83 and thus, "treating sources usually have
the most knowledge about their patients' conditions."8 4 Information arising
from the treating relationship was presumptively credible because "the
motivation for the relationship-and the information transmitted between
them--is treatment."'185 If the legitimating effect of more reliable outcomes
in the tort system was one of the aims of Daubert and Kumho Tire, a
similar goal surely had resonance for a bureaucracy assessing individuals'
ability to work and attempting to maintain political support for its
implementation of "cautious benevolence."
Of course, treating physician testimony is not automatically accurate;
the agency's rule simply uses that testimony as the starting point for
analysis, in effect orchestrating a debate in the mind of the AD between
the opinion of the treating physician and the rest of the evidence. In some
cases, the treating physician loses the debate; even then, however,
information arising from the treating relationship is central. For example,
in Burch v. Apfel,8 6 a treating physician's testimony in a disability claim
was found to be anything but accurate. The ALJ reached this conclusion
after comparing the physician's testimony with the physician's own
treatment notes about the patient and finding substantial discrepancies.18 7
The unquestioned statements in the treatment notes fatally undermined the
physician's credibility as a witness in the claim. The case illustrates how
a claimant can lose even with the support of a treating physician; more
importantly, the case embodies the belief that a treating relationship,
"0 1991 Standards, supra note 169, at 36,934.
'8,1d. at 36,935 (discussing knowledge possessed by treating sources).
182 The agency stated that "judicial decisions in several circuits pointed to a
need for a clear policy statement that would encourage uniformity of adjudication
and provide the public and the courts with a definitive explanation of our policy on
weighing treating source opinions." Id. at 36,934.
183 Id.
14 Id. at 36,935.
85 BLOCH, supra note 166, at 142.
186 Burch v. Apfel, No. 00-1402,9 Fed. Appx. 255,2001 WL 574634 (4th Cir.
May 29, 2001) (unpublished).87Id. at 259-60, 2001 WL 574634, at *3-*4.
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particularly one outside the context of litigation, produces reliable
information. The case suggests that a physician's treatment notes set a
standard of credibility that the same physician's testimony in the disability
claim must match.
Besides accuracy, the SSA's treating physician rule is said to serve the
federal courts' interest in retaining a role in individualizing the SSA's
program of mass justice. 8 ' Although this theory might explain a court-
made doctrine like the Second Circuit's treating physician rule, it does not
explain whythe agency adopted its owntreatingphysician rule; presumably
the agency had no interest in creating a rule that licenses judicial over-
intrusion. More likely, the agency sought to take power back from the
courts by striking its own balance between bureaucratic control and
individualized judgment. 89 By assigning controlling weight to a treating
physician's opinion based on data ("medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques") and consistency with other substantial
evidence in the record, the rule defines accuracy as the product of objective
and subjective components, numbers, and judgment. And by placing the
presumptively most reliable witness, the treating physician, at the center of
analysis, while still permitting that witness's opinion to be trumped by
other evidence, the rule provides a detailed roadmap for efficient decision
making, one that closely guides analysis but leaves room for particularized
assessment. As noted above, the rule organizes that debate in the mind of
the ALJ, but it is still a specific debate-about the facts and implications
of a specific claim.
The treating physician rule also may serve external purposes or have
important external effects, intended or not. The rule arguably creates a
serious incentive for distressed individuals to seek the kind of contact with
a physician that would amount to a treating relationship. In this sense, the
rule encourages conduct: if one is impaired in any significant way, he or
she should seek treatment, including a specialist's care. If the condition
persists or worsens to the point that the individual seeks disability benefits,
the treating relationship will be beneficial to the effort of qualifying for
benefits.
Of course, a conduct-forcing rule can work against a claimant who
enters into a treating relationship that improves his condition, or at least
188 Schneider, supra note 164, at 415-16.
189 See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 157-58 (1987) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring) (recognizing that the agency "faces an administrative task of staggering
proportions in applying the disability benefits provisions of the Social Security
Act" but also recognizing the statutory requirement that those who meet the
definition of disability should obtain benefits).
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casts doubt on its severity. In Johnson v. Apfel, 9" a claimant suffering from
a speech deficiency argued that he was disabled due to anxiety and
depression."' He offered the testimony of a treating psychiatrist, but the
ALJ found that "treatment with medication and speech therapy [had]
improved his communication."' 92 The treating physician's testimony
supporting the claim was therefore inconsistent with the record as a whole;
the ALJ denied the claim, and the appeals court affirmed."93 Although the
claimant might complain that the treating physician rule was not meant to
work in quite this way, it is difficult to argue with a rule that prompts a
positive therapeutic process.
In sum, the treating physician rule appears to serve goals of accurate
and efficient decision making and may even promote conduct that benefits
health. Still, none of these good effects is possible if decision makers
ignore or evade the rule. The ALJs' heavy caseload and any internal agency
"pressure[ ] to deny claims" may affect outcomes more than a rule of
evidence. 9a The "ethos of impartiality" may also blind judges to uncon-
scious bias in deciding cases.' A compensation system's rules may be
eminently fair on paper, but ALJs may misapply them and courts may leave
them unenforced. The sheer detail of the SSA's evidence-weighing rules,
however, may make them difficult to ignore; they do comprise a roadmap,
leaving little to the imagination except the weighing itself. But in the end,
it is good-faith fidelity to rules and critical reflection by judges at all levels
of the system that will make the process credible and its outcomes worthy
of "intellectual due process."
III. FEDERAL BLACK LUNG PROGRAM: A QUESTION OF BALANCE
Another system with a prominent treating physician rule is the U.S.
Department of Labor's black lung benefits program. 6 Congress designed
the program over thirty years ago to compensate victims of black lung
disease and their survivors. 9 7 The program awards benefits, payable by
coal company-employers, to eligible living coal miners, their dependents,
'90 Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145 (8th Cir. 2001).
'91 Id. at 1147.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 1148-49.
114 MILLS, supra note 4, at 3.
195Id. at 6.
19630 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (2000).
197 For a history of the problem of recognizing the existence of black lung
disease in the U.S. coal mining industry, see generally DERICKSON, supra note 10.
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and widows who lost husbands to the disease, also known as pneumoconio-
sis."98 The cases invariably involve medical issues, including whether the
miner has black lung disease, whether he is totally disabled in a respiratory
or pulmonary sense, and whether his pneumoconiosis is at least a contribut-
ing cause of his total respiratory or pulmonary disability.199 Like the social
security disability program, the black lung system is not governed by the
Federal Rules of Evidence but has its own regulatory procedures and
evidentiary rules.2" Unlike social security cases, black lung cases are
adversarial in nature.20'
The complexity of the issues, the adversarial structure of the claims
process, and the practical unavailability of attorneys' fees for claimant
lawyers often create insurmountable obstacles for coal miners, evidenced
by the fact that in 1994, the national approval rate for federal black lung
claims in the Office of Administrative Law Judges of the Department of
Labor was a mere 7.6%.202 Coal miners historically have been unable to
attract attorneys, principally because delays and other problems in
obtaining fees greatly discourage attorneys fromtaking blacklung cases.0 3
191 See 20 C.F.R. § 718.1 (2002) (summarizing statutory authority for blacklung
benefits).
199 See Toler v. E. Assoc. Coal Co., 43 F.3d 109, 111 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing 20
C.F.R. § 718.202-204 (2001)).200 Department of Labor regulations governing procedures specific to the black
lung benefits program are at 20 C.F.R. pt 725, subpt. D (2002) ("Adjudication
Officers"). Department of Labor rules ofpractice and procedure for administrative
hearings before the Office of Administrative Law Judges are at 29 C.F.R. pt. 18
(2001). Admissibility of evidence is permissive because ALJ hearings are non-jury
proceedings and the Federal Rules do not apply: "Because the ALJ is presumably
competent to disregard that evidence which should be excluded or to discount that
evidence which has lesser probative value, it makes little sense, as a practical
matter, for a judge in that position to apply strict exclusionary evidentiary rules."
Underwood v. Elkay Mining, Inc., 105 F.3d 946, 949 (4th Cir. 1997).
2 ' See 20 C.F.R. § 725.360 (2002) (providing the method for identifying parties
to proceedings). See generally Underwood, 105 F.3d at 949-50 (describing
common features of such adversarial hearings).202Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969, as amended, 62 Fed. Reg. 3338,3357 (Dep't Labor, proposed Jan. 22, 1997)
[hereinafter Proposed Rules].
203 During recent rulemaking proceedings of the Department of Labor, "wit-
nesses repeatedly brought to the Department's attention that few attorneys are
willing to represent clients, in part because of the many restrictions on the award
of attorneys' fees." Final Rule, supra note 19, at 79,980. The Supreme Court
upheld, against aDue Process challenge, the BlackLungBenefits Act's restrictions
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As a result, it is common for coal miners to appear unrepresented in
hearings against coal operators that have seasoned counsel.20 4 Under these
circumstances, the evidentiary records are predictably one-sided." 5 With
on payment of fees to claimants' attorneys. Under the Act, attorney's fees for a
claimant's attorney in a black lung case are permitted only if the claim succeeds,
disposition of the claim is final, and the fee is approved by the Department. Dep't
ofLabor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 718 (1990) (describing system and citing statute
and regulation). The Department also must take into account a number of stated
factors in deciding whether to grant the fee. Id. An attorney argued that long delays
faced by claimants' attorneys in receiving fees under this system discouraged
attorney involvement and effectively deprived black lung victims of legal
representation. Id. at 724. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals agreed,
having declared that "'a law nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly
discriminatory in its operation."' Comm. on Legal Ethics v. Triplett, 378 S.E.2d
82, 89 (W. Va. 1988) (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956)), rev'd
sub nom. Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715 (1990). However, the U.S.
Supreme Court reversed, finding the factual record "blatantly insufficient" to
support the constitutional claim that the fee system made attorneys unavailable.
Triplett, 494 U.S. at 724. The decision is sharply criticized in Robert A. Campbell,
United States Department of Labor v. Triplett: Black Lung Claimants Will
Continue to Suffer from a Lack of Legal Representation, 93 W. VA. L. REV. 713
(1991). Campbell argues that it is a "mockery ofjustice for the Legislature to pass
a piece of token legislation supposedly designed to provide black lung claimants
with benefits while failing to provide the means necessary to procure these
benefits." Id. at 733. A series of articles in the Roanoke Times in 2000 examined
various issues in connection with the federal black lung program, including the fee
regulations for claimants' attorneys. See Ron Nixon, Lawyers Are Few and Far
Between for Black Lung Plaintiffs; They Can Receive Compensation Only if They
Win the Case, ROANOKETIMES &WORLDNEWS, Nov. 25, 2000, at A9 [hereinafter
Nixon, Lawyers Are Few] (reporting that fee restrictions are a disincentive to
claimants' attorneys); Nixon, A Coalfield Legacy, supra note 20 ("Few attorneys
will take black lung cases because the cases can last for decades and miners'
lawyers don't get paid unless they win. And even if the case is won, federal
regulations allow coal companies to challenge the legal fees.").
204 Nixon, Lawyers are Few, supra note 203 ("The shortage of miners' attor-
neys means that thousands of relatively uneducated miners end up representing
themselves. They go up against coal company lawyers who specialize in black lung
litigation. No one tracks exactly how many miners represent themselves in black
lung claims.").
205 In a 1997 rnlemaking notice, the Department of Labor stated: "Currently, in
establishing their eligibility to benefits, claimants must confront the vastly superior
economic resources of their adversaries: coal mine operators and their insurance
carriers. Often, these parties generate medical evidence in such volume that it
overwhelms the evidence supporting entitlement that claimants can procure."
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no attorney and little money with which to develop medical evidence, coal
miners have trouble navigating the administrative process and usually
submit much less evidence from consulting physicians than the coal
operators.2 6 For years, the operators in each claim customarily submitted
numerous reports from highly-credentialed physicians, while miners
produced a physical examination, including x-ray and blood-gas evidence,
and a report from a treating or examining physician. 7 This imbalance
fueled the bitterness endemic to these cases.20 8 In 2000, the Department of
Labor finally addressed the financial disparity between the parties and the
resulting disparities in record evidence.2° The agency placed limitations on
ProposedRules, supra note 202, at 3338. The Department adopted the limitations
on the amount of evidence that the parties to a black lung claim may submit to the
record. See FinalRule, supra note 19, at 79,920.
206 On the problem of miners representing themselves, see Nixon, Lawyers Are
Few, supra note 203 ("It can be a serious undertaking for [an unrepresented] miner
with declining health: keeping track of hearing dates, preparing evidence for
hearings and taking depositions."). On the imbalance between parties in developing
evidence, see Woodward v. Director, OWCP, 991 F.2d 314, 321 (6th Cir. 1993),
where the court in a black lung case recognized that fairness is at risk when one
side has the ability "to hire significantly more experts because it has infinitely more
resources." Underthose circumstances, the court stated, "the truthseeking function
of the administrative proceeding is skewed and directly undermined." Id.217 In Westmoreland Coal Co. v. Bradley, No. 00-1192,2 Fed. Appx. 245,249,
2001 WL 46492, at *3 (4th Cir. Jan. 19,2001), the courtreversed an ALJ who had
relied on the medical opinion of a coal miner's examining physician for a finding
of pneumoconiosis. According to the court, the AUL erred by failing to take into
account the fact that the coal operator submitted "thirty negative [x-ray] readings,
all by... six [different] certified readers" after the coal miner had submitted his
physician's assessment. In Lisa Lee Mines v. Director, OWCP, 86 F.3d 1358 (4th
Cir. 1996) (en banc), the Fourth Circuit court showed awareness of the power of
financial resources in black lung claims. The court discussed an earlier claimwhich
had been denied by agency personnel but had never been appealed by the coal
miner. Apparently the record of the claim contained strong evidence that the miner
had complicated pneumoconiosis, a severe form ofblack lung disease, but the court
said it could "only speculate" that the decision would have been overturned if the
claimant had brought an appeal. Id. at 1361 n.6. The court stated that "[flor all we
can know, had [the claimant] requested a hearing, the [coal operator] would have
produced a dozen radiologists to deny that his x-rays were positive for complicated
pneumoconiosis." Id.
208 Ron Nixon, Benefits Claims Process Is As Slow, Painful as the Disease,
Miners Say, ROANoKE TIMES & WORLD NEws, Nov. 24,2000, at A13 (reporting
anger of black lung claimants at slowness of the process and lack of finality).
209 FinalRule, supra note 19, at 79,989-94.
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the amount of evidence that either side may submit, with an escape hatch
in the form of a "good cause" exception.2"' Industry challenged the
evidentiary limitations in a federal court case that is still pending.2" Even
if the new rules survive judicial review, it is unclear how liberally ALJs
will construe the "good cause" exception and thus whether the problem of
evidentiary imbalance in black lung litigation has truly been solved.
From the inception of the federal black lung program in 1969 through
the 1990s, courts have acknowledged the importance of treating physicians'
opinions in black lung litigation.2" 2 For example, in 1978, the Third Circuit
cited Congress' expectation that "the diagnoses of treating physicians
would play a major role in the determination of eligibility for black lung
benefits."2 3 In another early case, the Fourth Circuit stated that it "places
great reliance on a claimant's treating physician. 21 _ By the 1990s, how-
ever, the Fourth Circuit appeared less receptive to treating physicians and.
limited circuit precedents to their precise holdings. In 1993, the court
declared that a treating physician's opinion had no "greater weight'"215 than
the opinion of other physicians and maintained that neither the Fourth
Circuit nor the Benefits Review Board of the Department of Labor "ha[d]
ever fashioned either a requirement or a presumption that treating or
examining physicians' opinions be given greater weight than opinions of
other expert physicians.21 6 Writing for the court, Judge Luttig minimized
prior statements about according "especial consideration" to opinions of
treating and examining physicians,21 7 and he rejected the notion that anALJ
210 See 20 C.F.R. § 725.414 (2002) (describing evidentiary procedures); id. §
725.456(b)(1) (delineating the "good cause" exception).
211 The rules were upheld in National Mining Ass'n v. Chao, 160 F. Supp. 2d
47 (D.D.C. 2001). The National Mining Association is seeking reversal in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.212 See Proposed Rules, supra note 202, at 3342 (listing cases).
2 13 Schaafv. Mathews, 574 F.2d 157, 160 (3d Cir. 1978) (citing S. REP. 92-743
(1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2305, 2318). The Court also quoted the
statement of Dr. Donald Rasmussen from the Senate Report:
I would like also to urge the people who administer the provisions of the
black lung compensation to perhaps make more use of the opinion of the
miner's family doctor in terms of the existence of lung disease.... I think
very little attention is paid to the fact that the doctor may well know his
patient suffers one of the general respiratory diseases.
Id., reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2305, 2318.
214 Hubbard v. Califano, 582 F.2d 319, 323 (4th Cir. 1978).
215 Grizzle v. Pickands Mather & Co., 994 F.2d 1093, 1097 (4th Cir. 1993).
216 Id.
217 Id.
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need even consider the treating relationship in evaluating the credibility of
medical evidence.2"8 In a dissent, Judge Hall agreed with the obvious point
that treating physician opinions are not accorded "per se dispositive
weight,"2 9 but he stated that a doctor's status as treating physician provided
"a basis for credibility that should not be disregarded without articulable
cause." ' The majority and dissent thus differed on whether it was
necessary for an ALJ to consider the treating status of the physician, the
majority indicating that the answer was no. The Fourth Circuit appeared to
have no treating physician rule, although it stopped short of making that
statement outright.
The following year, another panel of the same Circuit seemed to think
that a treating physician rule was alive and well. In Grigg v. Director,
OWCP, the court stated that although a miner's treating physician "is not
as highly qualified as the other physicians whose opinions appear in this
record, his status as treating physician entitles his opinion to great, though
not necessarily dispositive, weight." The Fourth Circuit, then, was less
than crystal-clear on whether a treating relationship could have intrinsic
value that an adjudicator should take into account.
The Seventh Circuit has been less ambiguous. In Peabody Coal Co. v.
McCandless,' the court baldly declared it "irrational" in black lung
litigation to give preference to a physician's opinion simply due to the
treating relationship.2 4 Writing for the court, Judge Easterbrook ironically
found the opposite assumption-that treating physicians are biased-to be
quite rational. Judge Easterbrook stated: "Treating physicians often
succumb to the temptation to accommodate their patients (and their
survivors) at the expense of third parties such as insurers, which implies
attaching a discount rather than a preference to their views." '
As noted above, the Department of Labor proposed procedural and
substantive reforms of the black lung benefits program in 1996. A three-
year rule making procedure culminated in the promulgation of new
regulations at the end of the Clinton Administration, 6 and the Bush
2181 d. at 1097-98.
219 Id. at 1101 (Hall, J., dissenting).
I20 d. (Hall, J., dissenting).
' Grigg v. Director, OWCP, 28 F.3d 416 (4th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 420 (emphasis added).
2 Peabody Coal Co. v. McCandless, 255 F.3d 465 (7th Cir. 2001).
241d. at469 (quoting Peabody Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, 972 F.2d 178, 180
(7th Cir. 1992)).
= Id.
26 See Final Rule, supra note 19.
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Administration chose to defend the rules against an industry court
challenge. 7 The reforms included a treating physician rule.228 The rule
recognizes that a treating physician may have a "thorough understanding
of the miner's pulmonary condition"2 -- or may not. The rule provides
"guidelines for the adjudicator to determine whether to afford special
weight to an opinion from the miner's treating physician.""0 Rejecting an
"automatic acceptance" of the treating physician's opinion," the rule is
designed, according to the Department of Labor, "to force a careful and
thorough assessment of the treatment relationship. 232 To that end, the rule
lists "criteria for evaluating the quality of the doctor-patient relationship as
indicia of the potential insight the physician may have gained from on-
going treatment of the miner." ' ALJs therefore are to engage in "critical
analysis" of the subject matter of the treatment, i.e., whether the physician
provided pulmonary or respiratory treatment, how long the physician
treated the patient, how often the treating took place, and what types of
tests and examinations the physician carried out."24 The ALJ "must also
weigh that report against all other relevant evidence in the record." ' 5
The rule creates no presumption in favor of the treating physician's
opinion; rather it delineates aspects of physician-patient relationship that
must be considered before deciding whether the physician's opinion on
issues of disease, disability, and causation merit "controlling weight."
Although the social security and black lung rules are similar, the social
security rule has a different legal effect, according to the Department. In
declaring that "[g]enerally, we give more weight to opinions from your
treating sources,"236 the social security rule "demonstrates an affirmative
preference for reports from treating physicians,""2 7 whereas the black lung
rule is "more qualified in permitting 'controlling weight' only if the
regulatory criteria warrant it."238 The difference appears to be a matter of
227 See National Mining Ass'n v. Chao, 160 F. Supp.2d 47 (D.D.C. 2001).
22820 C.F.R. § 718.104(d) (2002). Forthe agency's discussion, see FinalRule,
supra note 19, at 79,930-35.
229 Final Rule, supra note 19, at 79,932.
230 Id. at 79,931.
231 Id. at 79,932.
232Id.
233 Id. at 79,931.
234 Id.
2
35 Id. at 79,934.
236 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) (2002).
237 Final Rule, supra note 19, at 79,934.
238 Id.
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degree; both rules are non-mechanical, requiring deference to treating
physicians if it is reasonable to do so in the context of the entire record.
The social security rule focuses first on the opinion's basis in medical
testing and data and its consistency with the record; only if the opinion is
either unsupported by data or inconsistent with other substantial evidence
does the ALJ consider the list of factors for assigning less than controlling
weight. In contrast, the black lung rule focuses from the outset on the
quality of the treating relationship, asking whether the relationship was
sufficient to afford the physician superior understanding of the miner's
condition 39 Both rules share the conviction that the treating relationship
can be, depending on its quality, decisive of crucial medical questions.
Like the tort system and the social security system, this rule seeks
accuracy by requiring a high level of physician explanation as well as by
encouraging a significant physician-treating relationship. But the black lung
treating physician rule pursues accuracy a third way as well: by helping to
balance, even roughly, the input of each side to the ultimate determinations.
As noted above, the new regulations promulgated in December 2000
achieved significant reform, one part of which was to place numerical
limitations on the amount of evidence that each side in a black lung claim
could submit into the record.24 This was clearly an effort to keep one
party's financial ability to obtain evidence from controlling the outcomes
of cases and to make the system's results more rational.241 The treating
physician rule is part of the same effort. It focuses the adjudicator's
attention on matters of quality rather than quantity. The underlying theory
is that closer equivalence of opportunity between the parties to advance
their positions, coupled with critical analysis of conclusions emanating
from a doctor-patient relationship not based on litigation but on treatment,
will generate better informed individual decisions and a more credible
system overall.242 In this sense, the black lung treating physician rule
embraces not only the tort system's emphasis on the quality of expert
opinion and the social security system's emphasis on the treating relation-
ship, but also its own systemic concern that a fairer system of proof can
improve the accuracy of results. If the story ofjustice in the tort system has
been the effort to improve the intellectual quality of expertise to which
juries are exposed and if the story ofjustice in the immense social security
system has been the effort to devise rules of analysis that are administrable
z23 Id.
24o See supra text accompanying notes 209-11.
241 See supra text accompanying notes 209-11.
242 See Proposed Rules, supra note 202, at 3342.
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yet conducive to accurate results, then the story ofjustice in the black lung
system has been the effort to seek accuracy by reforming skewed proce-
dures and spelling out a fairer way to weigh the evidence.
But is there yet a better way? Are treating physicians the solution to the
need for greater accuracy in these systems? What of Judge Easterbrook's
strong doubt that treating physicians could be objective? Perhaps decision
makers should look to independent physicians who have no other interest
in a claim.243 Should the medical issues in federal black lung cases be
delegated to medical experts who are wholly independent, as is now the
practice in the Kentucky state black lung system? It is to that compensation
system that we turn for a final comparison.
IV. KENTUCKY BLACK LUNG SYSTEM:
PRESUMPTIVE WEIGHT TO UNIVERSITY EVALUATORS
In Kentucky, workers are permitted to file for workers' compensation
benefits for occupational disease arising out of their employment. 2" The
Kentucky Revised Statutes authorize benefits for coal workers who have
pneumoconiosis"4 and impose financial liability on a claimant's last
employer.246 Proceedings are adversarial. Pursuant to amendments passed
in 1994, each side is limited in the amount of evidence that can be
submitted into the record.247
In 1996, Kentucky Governor Paul Patton called for reform of the state's
black lung program, calling it "a program which has long ago outlived its
usefulness ' and urging a legislative cut of the program by 67%.249 He
noted that "[m]iners constitute less that 2% of Kentucky's workforce, and
receive about 55% of all workers' compensation benefits." 250 Following the
243 Consultative examiners already play a significant role in social security
disability proceedings. They serve various functions, including filling in the record
and testing claimants' medical evidence. See BLOCH, supra note 166, at 138-41
(noting sentiment among some decision makers that consultative examiners have
more credibility than treating physicians).
244 National Mines Corp. v. Pitts, 806 S.W.2d 636 (Ky. 1991).
245KY. REV. STAT. ANN. [hereinafter KR.S.] § 342.732 (1997).
246 Id. § 342.316(a)(1), (10); see Begley v. Mountain Top, Inc., 968 S.W.2d 91
(Ky. 1998).
24 7 K.R.S. § 342.033 (1997).
248 Press Release, Reform Bill to Protect the Injured Worker and Their Job,
Governor Disappointed by Labor Leaders (Dec. 10, 1996) (on file with author).
24 9 id.
250OId.
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Governor's lead, the General Assembly passed legislation providing
authority for administrative law judges, on their own motion or at the
request of a party, to obtain independent evaluations of medical issues from
physicians at the University of Kentucky and the University of
Louisville."' In cases of occupational disease, referral to a university
evaluator is mandatoryl 2 The university evaluator is required to render a
written report to the commissioner within fifteen days of the exami-
nation?"3
The key provision relates to the decisional impact of the evaluator's
report. The statute provides that "[t]he clinical findings and opinions of the
designated evaluator shall be afforded presumptive weight by arbitrators
and administrative law judges and the burden to overcome such findings
and opinions shall fall on the opponent of that evidence." 4 If the ALJ
rejects the evaluator's findings and opinions, the ALJ "shall specifically
state in the order the reasons for rejecting that evidence." 5 Several years
after enactment of this legislation, Governor Patton indicated that the
purpose underlying the 1996 legislation was to promote impartial medical
review and accurate results.256
In a 2000 case, Magic Coal Co. v. Fox,257 the Kentucky Supreme Court
explained that by according "presumptive weight" to the reports of
university evaluators, "the legislature intended to create a rebuttable
presumption" in favor of an evaluator's report.258 The court observed that
in cases of occupational disease, "fact-finders are confronted with medical
evidence in which the clinical findings and opinions introduced on behalf
of one party are vastly different from those introduced on behalf of the
21 K.R.S. § 342.315 (Supp. 2000).
1 2 Id. § 342.316(3)(b)(4)(b); see also Magic Coal Co. v. Fox, 19 S.W.3d 88,
91, 94 (Ky. 2000); James Michael Kemp & Laurie Goetz Kemp, Kentucky
Workers' Compensation Law Update: Issues Facing Employers, Employees,
Medical Providers, Insurers And Practitioners As House Bill I Continues To
Evolve, 26 N. KY. L. REv. 67, 81-83 (1999).
R K. S. § 342.315(3) (Supp. 2000).
114Id. § 342.315(2).
M Id.
256 The Governor stated that "[o]ne of the very important reforms made in 1996
was to place the diagnosis of black lung in our public universities' medical
schools." Statement, Gov. Paul E. Patton, Workers' Compensation Statement, Feb.
16,2000, available athttp://gov.state.ky.us/legislativeinits/2000/2.l7start.pdf. He
expressed "great confidence inthe ability of the professional staffs of these schools
to provide accurate and unbiased medical opinions." Id.
2 Magic Coal Co. v. Fox, 19 S.W.3d 88 (Ky. 2000).
2 1 Id. at 95.
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opponent. '259 In these circumstances, findings and opinions "from an
unbiased medical expert would reasonably be expected to provide an
accurate assessment of the medical status of the [claimant] ... and would
assist the fact-finder in weighing the conflicting evidence. 2 60 The court
found it reasonable for the legislature
to infer that... the clinical findings and opinions of physicians who are
affiliated with a medical school are informed by some degree of expertise
and are more likely to be free from a preconceived bias toward either the
plaintiff or the defense than those of a physician who has been hired to
testify on behalf of the plaintiff or defendant.261
A university evaluator's conclusions are therefore presumed to be accurate,
and the party whose position is contrary to the university evaluator's has
the burden of going forward with rebuttal evidence.262
A dissenting Justice ridiculed the legislature's assumption that
university evaluators possess greater objectivity or accuracy in their
diagnostic assessments.263 Justice Graves maintained: "There is no rational
reason to believe a university physician is better qualified solely because
he works in Lexington or LouisviUe." 2 Finding the statute's premise to be
"nothing more than sophistical conjecture, ' 65 the dissent concluded that
K.R.S. § 342.315(2) constituted an arbitrary government act in violation of
the Kentucky Constitution.2"
At issue in Magic Coal were several black lung claims which were
referred to university evaluators. In one claim, although the university
evaluator read an x-ray as negative for pneumoconiosis and the employer's
doctors read two x-rays as negative, the ALJ ruled for the claimant because
two "well-qualified pulmonary specialists 2 67 rendered opinions supporting
the claim. The Supreme Court upheld the ALJ's grant of benefits.268 In
another claim discussed in Magic Coal, the Supreme Court again upheld
the ALJ's conclusion that a claimant's evidence-reports of the same two
259 Td.
260 Id.
2611 d. at 95-96.
262 Id. at 96.
263 Id. at 98 (Graves, J., dissenting).
2 Id. at 99 (Graves, J., dissenting).265 Id. (Graves, J., dissenting).
266 Id. (Graves, J., dissenting).
267 Id. at 98 (internal quotation marks omitted).
268Id. at 97-98 (opinion of the Court).
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well-credentialed, examining specialists-successfully rebutted the
presumption favoring the university evaluator's negative conclusions. 269
This fascinating case prompts at least two observations. First, although
compensation systems differ in the choice of presumptively trustworthy
experts, they share a rather constant search for the most reliable and cost-
effective means of achieving accurate results. In the Kentucky workers'
compensation system for occupational disease, the means to that end has
been the university evaluator; in social security and federal black lung, it
has been the treating physician; in some tort cases, it has been the physician
who provides a well-reasoned differential diagnosis. Kentucky's search is
ongoing. In 2001, convinced that state black lung process has been too
restrictive, the Governor backed legislation to amend the system.27 He
proposed eliminating the university evaluator's function in black lung
claims, indicating that it had not been quite the perfect solution after all. 7 '
As 2001 came to a close, legislators were still debating on how to build a
fair, accurate system.272
A second observation is that regardless of how or where a system sets
its evidentiary baseline, compensation cases may well turn on a combina-
tion of credentials and contact with the claimant. In Magic Coal, the
university evaluator's presumed correctness was overcome by the opinion
of examining specialists. When a specialist with "independent judgment"
collides with a specialist having "first-hand knowledge" and when the
269 Id. at 98.
270 Only 11 Black Lung Claims Ok'd in Ky. After New Law, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE, Nov. 17, 2001, at 8A [hereinafter Only 11] (reporting that Governor
Patton, "a former coal operator," initially championed the tougher eligibility rules
but now acknowledges they "went too far").
271 The proposed modification, which did not pass, involved achieving a
consensus on interpretations of x-ray films submitted by the employee and the
employer in a black lung workers' compensation claim. If x-ray interpretations
conflict, the Commissioner of Workers' Compensation would send the x-ray films
to a third x-ray reader selected randomly from a list of x-ray specialists (B-readers).
The third x-ray reader would choose the "most diagnostic" of the films and report
his reading of that film. If "consensus" is thereby reached (basic agreement by two
of the three x-ray readers), the consensus readingbecomes the correct classification
unless overcome by clear and convincing evidence. H.B. 132, 2001 Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2001) (proposing to amend K.R.S. §§ 342.315-.316, but failing to
pass before the end of the Regular Session).
272 Only 11, supra note 270 (reporting enthusiasm of industry group for con-
tinuation of university evaluator program, and complaint of Kentucky State AFL-
CIO president "Yet the current method of identifying black lung has found only
a handful of miners afflicted with this disease. There is something wrong here").
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decision maker reasonably chooses to rely on the latter, then we hear
echoes at least of why other systems have placed faith in the treating
physician.
CONCLUSION
This Article, written for a symposium on public health, has examined
the quest for intellectual due process in several prominent compensation
systems. Each system has developed evidentiary rules calculated to improve
the chances of attaining accurate and more credible results. Whether these
systems succeed or fail is, of course, a function of much else besides the
choice of evidentiary rules. But the rules-particularly as they reflect a
common interest in the potential reliability of the treating physician and as
they encourage treating relationships across a range of contexts--are an
important part of a larger picture. Public health scholars and authorities
should be aware of these efforts. They should recognize that these systems
offer an important source of credible information about health hazards that
still afflict the American workplace in the new century. And they should
actively participate in further reforms of systems that in design and
application still too often fall short of justice.
